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Maize marketingThe food price crisis of 2007–2008 and recent resurgence of food prices have focused increasing attention
on the causes and consequences of food price volatility in international food markets and the developing
world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, we examine the patterns and trends in food price
volatility using an unusually rich database of African staple food prices. We ﬁnd that international grain
prices have become more volatile in recent years (2007–2010) but no evidence that food price volatility
has increased in the region. This contrasts with the widespread view that food prices have become more
volatile in the region since the global food crisis of 2007–2008. In addition, the results suggest that price
volatility is lower for processed and tradable food than for nontradable food, that volatility is lower in the
major cities than in secondary cities, and that maize price volatility is actually higher in countries with
the most active intervention to stabilize maize prices. These ﬁndings suggest that greater attention
should be given to the (high) level of food prices in the region rather than volatility per se, that regional
and international trade can play a useful role in reducing food price volatility, and that traditional food
price stabilization efforts may be counterproductive.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Introduction
Background
As a result of the global food crisis of 2007–2008 and the resur-
gence of food prices in 2010, there is unprecedented interest in
high and volatile food prices. The 2011 State of Food Insecurity in
the World, jointly published by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development,
and theWorld Food Programme, concentrates on the impact of vol-
atile food prices on food security in developing countries (FAO
et al., 2011a,b). Agricultural Outlook 2010–2011, produced by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the FAO, also focuses on the issue of food price volatility (OECD
and FAO, 2011). The 2011 Global Hunger Index, prepared by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) adopts food
price volatility as the special theme for 2011 (IFPRI, 2011). In Octo-
ber 2010, the United National Committee on World Food Security
commissioned a study of food price volatility, which resulted in a
report published in October 2011 (HLPE, 2011). And in June
2011, the ministers of agriculture of the G20 countries prepared
an action plan to address food price volatility (G20, 2011).The reasons for the interest in the topic are clear. Instability in
the price of staple foods is an important source of risk in develop-
ing countries. This is particularly true for poor households in sub-
Saharan Africa. Three factors contribute to the strong link between
food price volatility and risk for poor African households. First, the
variation in staple food prices tends to be higher in Africa than in
other regions (Minot, 2011). Second, poor households allocate a
large share, often more than 60%, of their budgets to food, so a gi-
ven variability in food prices has a large effect on purchasing
power (FAO et al., 2011a,b, 14). Third, the share of the population
that depends on agriculture for its livelihood is generally larger
in Africa than in other regions. Within rural areas, semi-subsis-
tence farmers are partially insulated from the effect of ﬂuctuations
in staple food prices, while cash-crop farmers, commercial grain
producers, wage laborers, and those with nonfarm enterprises
are more vulnerable (Benson et al., 2008).
Although food prices have increased substantially since 2006,
the evidence of food price volatility is mixed. Gilbert and Morgan
(2010) examine long-term trends in international food prices and
ﬁnd that volatility has been lower since 1990 than during the
1970–1989 period. They also test the difference in volatility be-
tween the 2007–2009 period and previous years. Of the 19 com-
modities tested, only 3 showed a statistically signiﬁcant increase
in price volatility (soybeans, soybean oil, and groundnut oil).
The OECD and FAO (2011) report states that there is no long-
term trends toward increased volatility but notes that the ‘‘implied
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beans has been rising steadily since 1990.1 FAO et al. (2011a,b, 8)
note that there is little or no evidence of a long-term increase in the
volatility of international food prices but argue that ‘‘there is no doubt
that the period since 2006 has been one of extraordinary volatility.’’
However, volatility in international prices affects households
and businesses only to the extent that it is transmitted to domestic
markets. It is almost universally accepted that food prices in Africa
have become more volatile in recent years (see Gerard et al., 2011
and G20, 2011). However, few if any empirical studies have exam-
ined the trends and patterns in food price volatility in the region
using recent data. FAO et al. (2011, 22) provide a graph showing
that the average volatility of the prices of wheat, maize, and rice
rose in 2008 before falling again in 2009; however, their report
does not test the statistical signiﬁcance of the change, nor does it
report estimates of volatility before 2007.
The issue of changes in food price volatility has important impli-
cations for policy. The trends in food prices since 2007 have revived
interest in regulating foodmarkets in SSA. As Gerard et al. (2010, 11)
note that ‘‘after the food crisis in 2008, the need for market regula-
tion and the necessity of ﬁghting price instability have been ac-
cepted by a growing percentage of experts and decision-makers.’’
A number of countries are increasing the size of their food re-
serves, and the topic of international food reserves is again under
discussion (Murphy, 2009; von Braun and Torero, 2009). Gerard
et al. (2011) argues that the high and volatile prices of food
strengthen the case for government intervention to stabilize food
prices in developing countries, in spite of the practical difﬁculties
of doing so.Objectives
The goal of this paper is to examine the patterns and trends in
food price volatility in Africa. In particular, we are interested in
testing the widely held belief that food prices have become more
volatile since the global food crisis of 2007–2008.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the deﬁnition and measurement of food price volatility,
the data used in this analysis, and the method for statistically test-
ing differences in volatility. Section 3 provides the results of the
analysis. To provide some context, we ﬁrst examine volatility in
international grain prices. Then the patterns and trends in food
price volatility in Africa are explored, including changes in volatil-
ity in recent years. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the results and
discusses their implications.Data and methods
Deﬁning and measuring food price instability
Food price instability refers to variation over time in the price of
food. In this report, we focus primarily on instability in the price of
maize, rice, wheat, and other staple foods in Africa. Although cas-
sava and other root crops are important staples in many countries
in the region, these cannot be stored long after harvest and, for this
reason, are not the focus of government efforts to stabilize food
prices. Cassava does play an important role in helping households
adapt to grain price instability (Dorosh et al., 2009; Prudencio and
Al-Hassan, 1994).
Variation is sometimes measured using the coefﬁcient of varia-
tion (CV), deﬁned as CV = s/l, where s is the standard deviation of1 Implied volatility is derived from the futures market price of a commodity, the
risk-free interest rate, and a theoretical model of how asset prices should be formed in
the face of price volatility. As such, it is different from the actual volatility of the price.the variable of interest over a given time period and l is the mean
value over that period. However, this measure has a disadvantage
when used to measure price instability. Prices are often non-
stationary, exhibiting a unit-root or random-walk behavior. Under
these conditions, the variance and standard deviation approach
inﬁnity as the time period approaches inﬁnity. In practical terms,
this means that the estimate of variability depends on the length
of time covered by the sample.
Another measure of variability, often used in ﬁnancial market
analysis, is the standard deviation of returns, where the return is
deﬁned as the proportional change in price from one period to
the next. The return is generally measured as the difference in
the logarithm of prices from one period to the next. This concept,
called unconditional volatility, can be expressed as follows:
Unconditional volatility ¼ stdevðrÞ
X 1
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If prices follow a unit-root process with a multiplicative error
term, then r will be stationary and its standard deviation will not
depend on the size of the sample. This concept is unconditional
in that it does not take into account any prior information and is
based only on observed variation in returns.
An alternative approach is to test the conditional variance of
returns using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroske-
dasticity (GARCH) model (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). A
GARCH(p,q) model can be expressed as follows:
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The GARCHmodel has the advantage of allowing the variance of
returns (and hence volatility) to change over time as a function of
lagged squared residuals (e2ti) and lagged variance (r2tj). Condi-
tional volatility is the estimated value of rt. This approach has been
used by Gilbert and Morgan (2010) and others to study changes in
(conditional) volatility in food prices.
Volatility in food prices can be measured at the producer,
wholesale, or retail level. In Africa, most data on food prices are
at the wholesale or retail level. If margins between producer,
wholesale, and retail prices are a constant proportion of the price,
then measuring the volatility at any of the three levels will give the
same result. However, if margins are ﬁxed, then producer prices
will be the most volatile and retail prices the least, with the vola-
tility of wholesale prices falling in between. In practice, however,
other factors inﬂuence the marketing margins such as the degree
of competition at each level in the channel, the availability of infor-
mation, changes in road quality or congestion, and the volume of
trade between markets. Instability can also be measured at differ-
ent time scales, using daily, monthly, or annual price data.
Data sources
This analysis uses data on international grain prices and on sta-
ple food prices in Africa. Data on international grain prices were
obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In particu-
lar, we use the prices of maize (No. 2 yellow maize free-on-board
(FOB) Gulf of Mexico), rice (5% broken milled white rice FOB
Bangkok), and wheat (No. 1 hard red winter wheat, ordinary
protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico) from the IMF database (IMF, 2011).
Table 1
Unconditional volatility in international grain prices. Source: Analysis of price data
from IMF (2011) covering the period January 1980 to December 2010.
N 1980–06 2007–10 F stat p
Maize 371 0.054 0.082 0.44 0.00
Rice 371 0.054 0.101 0.29 0.00
Wheat 371 0.048 0.097 0.24 0.00
IMF food index 239 0.024 0.044 0.28 0.00
N 2003–06 2007–10 F stat p
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This analysis of food prices in Africamakes use of monthly prices
of staple foods compiled by the Famine Early Warning System Net-
work (FEWS-NET), a project funded by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). FEWS-NET collects some
prices, but most of their price data are gathered from statistical
agencies in the countries where it operates (see FEWS-NET, 2011a).
The analysis focuses on 10 staple foods: beans, bread, cooking
oil, cowpeas, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, teff, and wheat. Bread
and cooking oil were included to explore whether the volatility
of prices of processed foods differs from that of staple crops.
Price data invariably contains some missing values, so it is nec-
essary to establish criteria in selecting price series to analyze. For
the analysis of the patterns of volatility, we select price series that
contain at least 90% of the observations between January 2005 and
March 2011. This results in 167 price series from 15 countries:
Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozam-
bique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe. The bulk of the price series are at the retail level, though
12% are wholesale prices and 6% are assembly-level prices.
For the analysis of changes in volatility, it is useful to have a
somewhat longer time series. Thus, we limit ourselves to those
prices that include at least 90% of the observations between Janu-
ary 2003 and December 2010. This leaves 67 price series from 11
countries: Chad, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. This dataset in-
cludes prices for six staple foods: beans, cooking oil, maize, millet,
rice, and sorghum.
Analysis
To evaluate changes in unconditional price volatility, we test
the null hypothesis that the two sets of prices have the same stan-
dard deviation in returns and use the F-statistic to test the proba-
bility that the null hypothesis is true, using a 5% conﬁdence
threshold. In examining the patterns of price volatility across mar-
kets and commodities, we are often comparing two sets of price
series. The returns (r) are normalized by expressing them as devi-
ations from the mean return for each commodity. In this way, the
standard deviation of returns for a set of prices does not include
any cross-price differences in the mean return.2 The test is imple-
mented using the ‘‘sdtest’’ command in Stata.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we also test
changes in conditional price volatility. Because we are examining
over one hundred price series, it is convenient to apply the same
model to all series. We use the GARCH(1,1) model to estimate
the conditional volatility in food prices, since it has been shown
to perform well against alternative speciﬁcations (Hansen and
Lunde, 2001). In the interest of space and because the uncondi-
tional and conditional volatility results are quite similar, the
discussion focuses on the test of unconditional volatility, but also
describes any discrepancies between the two measures. The tests
of conditional volatility are presented in the annex.
Results
Volatility in international grain prices
To provide some context for interpreting the patterns and
trends in food price volatility in Africa, we begin by examining2 Normalized r is calculated as the deviation from the mean value of r for the price
series. Since the mean value of r is usually close to zero, the adjustment is minor. Even
if the mean value were large, normalizing r does not affect the standard deviation and
hence the calculation of volatility for an individual price series.grain price volatility in international markets. As described above,
volatility is deﬁned as the standard deviation of returns to com-
modity prices, where the return is the difference in the logarithm
of prices from one month to the next. The ﬁrst panel of Table 1
compares unconditional price volatility during 1980–2006 with
that during 2007–2010. The volatility of international rice and
wheat prices roughly doubled, as did the volatility of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) food price index. The volatility of inter-
national maize prices increased by more than 50%. All of these
increases are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The second panel of Table 1 compares price volatility during
2003–2006 with volatility during 2007–2010. This comparison is
provided because these are the two periods we use later to exam-
ine staple food prices in Africa. As before, the increases in volatility
of all three international prices and the IMF food price index are
statistically signiﬁcant. The volatility of the international price of
rice more than tripled, rising from 0.030 during 2003–2006 to
0.101 during 2007–2010. Analysis of the conditional volatility of
international grain prices reveals a similar pattern except that
the increase in volatility for maize prices is not statistically signif-
icant (see Table A1 in the annex). These ﬁndings conﬁrm the con-
ventional wisdom regarding increasing volatility in international
markets for food grains.
Distribution of food price volatility in sub-Saharan Africa
The analysis of the cross-sectional patterns in staple food price
volatility in Africa is based on a database of 167 monthly price ser-
ies, each of which covers the period January 2005 to March 2011.
The average volatility (standard deviation of returns) is 0.116 and
the median is 0.109 (see Fig. 1). One-quarter of the volatility mea-
sures are below 0.085 and three-quarters are below 0.141. The
highest volatility (0.46) was the retail price of maize in Harare, ex-
pressed in US dollars, which is not surprising given the economic
and political turmoil in the country during this period. The analysis
of conditional volatility is limited to 113 of these price series. For
about one-third of the prices, the GARCH estimation did not
achieve convergence. This is not surprising given that the log-like-
lihood function of the GARCH model is not always well behaved
and achieving a global maximum is sometimes difﬁcult (Zivot,
2009).
We can compare the volatility in African markets with the vol-
atility for the same commodities on the international market.
Using the IMF monthly price data, the unconditional volatility of
maize on international markets during this same time period is
0.073, while that of both rice and wheat is 0.082. Of the 47 maize
prices for which we have information from Africa, 46 are more vol-
atile than the international price of maize. Of the 21 rice prices
from Africa, 13 are more volatile than international price of rice.
And two of the three African wheat prices are more volatile than
the international price of wheat. Overall, 61 out of 71 African pricesMaize 96 0.054 0.082 0.44 0.01
Rice 96 0.030 0.101 0.09 0.00
Wheat 96 0.048 0.097 0.24 0.00
IMF food index 96 0.026 0.044 0.34 0.00
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Fig. 1. Distribution of unconditional volatility across 167 African staple food prices.
Source: Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January
2005 to March 2011.
Fig. 3. Returns to millet in Timbuktu. Source: Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET
(2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.
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ing international price.
To provide a visual illustration of the range of volatility, Fig. 2
shows the retail price of millet in Timbuktu (Mali). The uncondi-
tional volatility of this price during 2005–2011 is 0.058, placing
it at the 10th percentile in volatility, making it among the most sta-
ble prices among those under consideration. Figs. 3 and 4 show the
returns to the millet price and a 13-month moving average of vol-
atility, respectively. In contrast, the retail price of rice in Nampula
(Mozambique) has a volatility measure of 0.186, putting it at the
90th percentile in volatility. Figs. 5–7 show the retail price, returns,
and the moving average volatility for rice in Nampula.Fig. 4. Volatility of the millet price in Timbuktu. Source: Analysis of price data from
FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.Price volatility for different commodities
How does price volatility vary across commodities? Table 2
shows the price volatility between January 2005 and March 2011
for each product where data are available, as well as the results
of a test of the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference between
the price volatility of the commodity and the volatility of the other
commodities on the list.
According to the table, unconditional price volatility is lowest
for bread (0.028), wheat (0.094), and cooking oil (0.101). TheFig. 2. Retail price of millet in Timbuktu (Mali). Source: Analysis of price data from
FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.
Fig. 5. Retail price of rice in Nampula (Mozambique). Source: Analysis of price data
from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.analysis of conditional price volatility reveals a similar pattern:
these are three of the four least volatile commodities (see
Table A2 in the annex). It is interesting to note that the processed
foods are among those with the most stable prices. This may be re-
lated to the fact that the raw material accounts for a relatively
small share of the total costs and that other components of
Fig. 6. Returns to rice in Nampula. Source: Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET
(2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.
Fig. 7. Volatility of the price of rice in Nampula. Source: Analysis of price data from
FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.
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ity) may have more stable prices. However, any interpretation
must be tentative given the small number of price series in the
data: two for bread and eight for cooking oil.
The prices of teff, millet, and rice are also less volatile than the
average, whether measured as unconditional volatility (Table 2) or
conditional volatility (Table 13). The relatively low price volatility
for millet and teff is probably related to the fact that they are
drought-tolerant crops. Teff is grown almost exclusively in the
highlands of Ethiopia, while millet is grown in semiarid zones, par-
ticularly in West Africa. The relatively stable price of rice may beTable 2
Unconditional price volatility across products. Source: Analysis based on price data
from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Beans 878 12 0.133 0.905 0.04
Bread 149 2 0.028 21.378 0.00
Cooking oil 592 8 0.101 1.588 0.00
Cowpeas 369 5 0.230 0.283 0.00
Maize 3450 47 0.144 0.693 0.00
Millet 2224 30 0.105 1.544 0.00
Rice 2202 30 0.108 1.448 0.00
Sorghum 1914 26 0.124 1.044 0.22
Teff 296 4 0.104 1.495 0.00
Wheat 224 3 0.094 1.848 0.00
Total 12,298 167 0.127 0.000 0.00associated with the fact that it is a tradable commodity in most
countries in the region. As discussed above, in spite of recent in-
creases in volatility in world markets, world grain prices remain
more stable than African grain prices.
It is interesting to note that many of the products with rela-
tively stable prices (rice, wheat, and cooking oil) are tradable prod-
ucts. Imports account for a large share of the supply of wheat
(70%), rice (43%), and cooking oil (49%) in Africa (FAO, 2010). In
contrast, the four products with the highest price volatility (cow-
peas, maize, beans, and sorghum) are generally considered nontra-
dable. Although there is regional trade in all these staple crops,
international trade in these commodities is quite small relative
to the volume of domestic production and consumption. According
to the FAO (2010), imports account for just 8 percent of African
maize supply, 2% of sorghum supply, and 5% of the supply of
pulses.
Table 3 provides a test of the unconditional price volatility in
tradable goods (rice, wheat, and cooking oil) compared with that
of the other commodities. The price volatility of tradables is
0.106, while that of nontradables is 0.133, a difference that is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The conditional price volatility
of tradables is also signiﬁcantly higher than that of nontradables
(see Table A3).
The prices of tradable commodities are largely determined by
international markets, although ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate
and trade policy also play a role. In contrast, volatility in the price
of nontradable commodities is determined primarily by domestic
supply-and-demand conditions, particularly weather-related ﬂuc-
tuations in supply. These ﬁndings challenge the idea that instabil-
ity in international markets is the main source of price volatility in
Africa and suggest that domestic factors play a larger role in price
volatility. This ﬁnding raises questions about the widespread view
that self-sufﬁciency in staple food crops would reduce food price
volatility.
Price volatility across markets
This section considers the variation in price volatility across
markets. In particular, we focus on the volatility in maize prices
across countries, differences between coastal and landlocked coun-
tries, and differences in price volatility between the largest cities
and the smaller markets.
Maize price volatility across countries
In comparing price volatility across countries, it is convenient to
focus on maize for two reasons. First, the database contains a large
number of maize price series (47), ensuring at least a few prices in
each country. Second, maize is the most important source of calo-
ries in many African countries, particularly in eastern and southern
Africa (FAO, 2010). For this reason, the volatility in the price of
maize is more politically important than volatility in the price of
other food commodities.
Table 4 shows the unconditional volatility in maize prices in 11
countries, along with a statistical test of whether there is a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference between volatility in that country andTable 3
Unconditional price volatility of tradable and nontradable products. Source: Analysis
of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March
2011.
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Non-tradables 9280 126 0.133 0.000 0.00
Tradable products 3018 41 0.106 1.570 0.00
Total 12,525 167 0.127 0.000 0.00
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volatility is found in Zimbabwe (0.462), followed by Malawi
(0.197), Zambia (0.137), and Chad (1.32). The conditional volatility
of maize prices follows a similar pattern, except that the GARCH
model does not converge for Zimbabwemaize prices (see Table A4).
The extremely high volatility in maize prices in Zimbabwe is
probably attributable to the political and economic turmoil that
the country has experienced for the last 10–15 years. The conﬁsca-
tion and reallocation of large-scale commercial farms has dis-
rupted maize production, while hyperinﬂation and occasional
disturbances have discouraged investment. In addition, in 2002
the government of Zimbabwe gave the Grain Marketing Board
(GMB), a state trading enterprise, a virtual monopoly on maize
trade (it remained legal for farmers to market quantities up to
150 kg). These policies continued until market reforms were intro-
duced in 2010 (Takavarasha, 2006; Madera, 2011).
In Malawi, the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corpo-
ration (ADMARC) has played an important role in maize marketing
and trade. Its role has included serving remote areas, stabilizing
prices, and mobilizing surpluses for export. Although its purchases
and sales were declining in the years leading up to the global food
crisis, it was given expanded powers and resources in the wake of
the crisis (Chirwa, 2009).
In Zambia, the government created the Food Reserve Agency
(FRA) in 1995 to manage food security stocks. Purchases remained
a small share of annual production (0–9%) for the ﬁrst 10 years of
its existence. In 2005, the FRA was given a larger mandate and bud-
get, allowing it to open 600 buying station and to expand maize
procurement to about 25% of total production. The pan-territorial
procurement price is often above the local wholesale price, provid-
ing a signiﬁcant advantage to those able to sell to the FRA. Imports
and exports of maize and wheat require permits that specify the
quantity to be traded. In recent years, most of the permits have
been issued to the FRA. Thus, the FRA has come to play a dominant
role in both domestic maize marketing and international grain
trade (Dorosh et al., 2009).
In Kenya, the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) buys
and sells maize and other commodities in an effort to stabilize
prices. In the 1980s, the NCPB maintained a monopoly on domestic
and international trade in maize. In the early 1990s, reforms were
implemented to eliminate internal movement restrictions and
maize price controls. As a result of increased competition with
the private sector, the closure of many buying stations, and budget
cuts, the NCPB’s share of the maize marketing fell to 10–20% in the
second half of the 1990s. However, since 2005, under pressure
from large-scale commercial farmers and possibly in response to
the election cycle, the government began to increase funding to
NCPB, allowing it to purchase 25–35% of the marketed volume in
a good-harvest year or 10–15% of production (Ariga and Jayne,
2010).Table 4
Unconditional volatility in maize prices by country. Source: Analysis of price data from
FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to March 2011.
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Chad 223 3 0.132 1.20 0.07
Ethiopia 294 4 0.095 2.38 0.00
Kenya 597 8 0.117 1.62 0.00
Malawi 364 5 0.197 0.48 0.00
Mozambique 523 7 0.114 1.69 0.00
Niger 364 5 0.113 1.69 0.00
Nigeria 224 3 0.125 1.35 0.00
Tanzania 149 2 0.110 1.74 0.00
Uganda 73 1 0.092 2.47 0.00
Zambia 570 8 0.137 1.13 0.08
Zimbabwe 69 1 0.462 0.08 0.00
Total 3525 47 0.144The Ethiopia Grain Trading Enterprise is involved in buying and
selling grain on behalf of the government, but its operations are
quite small relative to the size of the grain market. Similarly, Tan-
zania has maintained small emergency food reserves but does not
actively attempt to stabilize prices. Uganda and Mozambique have
no state marketing board responsible for maize marketing, nor do
they maintain food reserves.
We can divide the countries roughly into two groups: those
with state marketing boards that maintain reserves and attempt
to stabilize prices, and those that do not intervene as actively in
maize markets. Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe can be clas-
siﬁed high-intervention countries, while the others are classiﬁed as
low-intervention countries. As shown in Table 5, maize price vola-
tility is more than 50% higher in countries where the government
intervenes more actively in maize markets (0.172) than in coun-
tries with relatively little intervention (0.113), a difference that is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This pattern holds even if
we exclude Zimbabwe from the analysis. The difference is also sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in the analysis of conditional price volatility
(see Table A5).
These results can be interpreted in at least two ways. It is
possible that maize price volatility would be even higher in the
countries with more active intervention policies. Perhaps the inter-
vention policies are a response to intrinsically more volatile prices
in those countries.
Another interpretation is that the efforts to stabilize prices and
manage maize markets are counterproductive. The uncertainty
created by government intervention in maize markets can cause
private traders to withdraw from the market, reducing the effect
of temporal arbitrage in smoothing prices over time. Indeed, a
number of researchers have suggested that active intervention by
the government in food markets, particularly when it involves
price controls or unpredictable purchases and sales, discourages
private traders from storage or trade in staple foodgrains. Unless
fully offset by public-sector grain-trading activity, this would exac-
erbate seasonal price volatility, regional price differences, and price
spikes during low-harvest years (Chirwa, 2009; Chapoto and Jayne,
2009; Byerlee et al., 2006).
Coastal versus landlocked
We expect that access to wider markets will reduce price vola-
tility. Based on this idea, we divide the markets into those that are
in a country with a coast and those that are in a landlocked coun-
try. For each commodity, we test the statistical signiﬁcance of dif-
ferences in the volatility between these two groups. The results are
shown in Table 6. Beans, bread, cooking oil, and cowpeas show no
signiﬁcant difference in price volatility between coastal and land-
locked countries. Furthermore, the prices of millet, rice, sorghum,
and wheat are signiﬁcantly less volatile in landlocked countries.
Only in the case of maize is price volatility higher in landlocked
countries (0.161) than in coastal countries (0.116), a difference that
is statistically signiﬁcant. Similar patterns are observed in condi-
tional price volatility (see Table A6).Table 5
Unconditional maize price volatility by level of intervention in maize markets. Source:
Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to
March 2011.
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Low 1850 25 0.113
High 1600 22 0.172
Total 3450 47 0.144 0.43 0.00
Note: Kenya, Malawi, Zambia are classiﬁed as having a high level of intervention,
while other countries fall in the low category.
Table 6
Unconditional price volatility in coastal and landlocked countries by product. Source:
Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to
March 2011.
Nbr obs Nbr prices Coastal Landlocked F stat p
878 12 0.134 0.121 1.23 0.28
149 2 0.029 0.027 1.14 0.56
592 8 0.105 0.098 1.16 0.20
369 5 0.246 0.218 1.27 0.10
3450 47 0.116 0.161 0.52 0.00
2224 30 0.125 0.100 1.55 0.00
2202 30 0.141 0.084 2.82 0.00
1914 26 0.144 0.115 1.56 0.00
224 3 0.122 0.076 2.60 0.00
Table 7
Unconditional price volatility in the largest city and other cities by product. Source:
Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2005 to
March 2011.
Nbr obs Nbr prices Largest city Other cities F stat p
Beans 878 12 0.098 0.142 0.48 0.00
Cooking oil 592 8 0.070 0.125 0.32 0.00
Maize 3450 47 0.098 0.151 0.42 0.00
Millet 2224 30 0.103 0.106 0.96 0.68
Rice 2202 30 0.071 0.116 0.38 0.00
Sorghum 1914 26 0.116 0.126 0.84 0.04
Teff 296 4 0.064 0.115 0.32 0.00
Wheat 224 3 0.095 0.092 1.07 0.75
Total 12,298 160 0.091 0.134 0.45 0.00
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whether a country has a coast or not is only a rough measure of
the access that traders in the country have to international mar-
kets. For example, the Kagera region in western Tanzania (a coastal
country) has less access to international markets than Kampala,
even though Uganda is a landlocked country.Large city versus smaller city
Another way to group markets is by the size of the city. In each
country, we identify the largest city, which is typically the capital
city. For each commodity, the difference in price volatility between
the largest city and other cities is compared and tested statistically.
As shown in Table 7, unconditional price volatility is lower in the
largest city than in other cities for six commodities: beans, cooking
oil, maize, rice, sorghum, and teff. Only millet and wheat do not
show any statistically signiﬁcant difference. Similar results are ob-
tained from the analysis of conditional price volatility, except that
the difference in volatility in the price of cooking oil is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and wheat price volatility is higher in the largest
cities (see Table A7).
The most likely explanation is that the largest city draws sur-
plus food from various parts of the country. Assuming some varia-
tion in agroecological conditions, this allows supplies to come
during different months of the year, thus smoothing prices over
the year. In contrast, a smaller city may be more affected by the lo-
cal harvest cycle and less able to draw supplies from larger markets
when needed. In addition, a large city is likely to be characterized
by better storage infrastructure and more competitive markets,
which could help stabilize prices.
Changes in price volatility over time
In this section, we test the widely-held perception that food
prices in domestic African markets have become more volatile
since the global food crisis of 2007–2008. To measure changes involatility over time, we limit ourselves to prices series that cover
the period January 2003 to December 2010, allowing no more than
10% of the observations during this period to be missing. These
tighter criteria reduce the number of price series available for anal-
ysis to 67. For each price series, we compare the level of volatility
during two four-year periods: 2003–2006 and 2007–2010. The rea-
son for splitting the sample in this way is that the global food crisis
began with the increase in commodity prices during 2007. Most
international prices peaked in mid-2008, before declining partially
2009, only to rise again in 2010.
Table 8 shows the level of unconditional volatility during these
two periods for each of the 67 food prices under consideration. The
results conﬁrm that some prices did become more volatile in the
2007–2010 period, including maize prices in two markets in Ken-
ya, maize prices in three markets in Mozambique, and rice prices
in one market in Chad. However, only 7 of the 67 prices tested
showed a statistically signiﬁcant increase in volatility between
2003–2006 and 2007–2010. Furthermore, 17 prices show a statis-
tically signiﬁcant decrease in volatility between these two periods.
For example, price volatility fell for maize in Maputo, rice in
N’Djamena, and sorghum in Nouakchott. The remaining 43 prices
tested did not show any statistically signiﬁcant change in volatility
between 2003–2006 and 2007–2010. In the analysis of conditional
volatility, 19 of the price series could not be analyzed due to non-
convergence in the GARCH estimation. Of the 48 remaining prices,
only two showed a change in volatility that was signiﬁcant at the
5% level and in both cases price volatility declined (these results
are available upon request).
It could be argued that the number of observations for each
price series (96 months) is not sufﬁcient to test changes in volatil-
ity. Two pieces of evidence suggest that this is not the explanation.
First, if volatility rose between the two periods but the sample size
was too small to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant differences, we would
expect the volatility to increase in most of the price series even if
the change was not signiﬁcant. In fact, unconditional volatility de-
clined in 50 of the prices and increased in only 17 (see Table 8).
Second, we can increase the sample size by aggregating the data
to the product level or by aggregating all 67 price series together.
Table 9 shows the aggregated results for each of the six products
and then aggregated across all products. Unconditional price vola-
tility of maize increased signiﬁcantly between 2003–2006 and
2007–2010, but price volatility of beans, millet, and rice declined.
No statistically signiﬁcant change in price volatility occurred with
cooking oil and sorghum. Across all commodities, volatility de-
clined by a relatively small but statistically signiﬁcant margin.
These results conﬁrm the conventional wisdom that maize
prices have become more volatile since 2007 (although the in-
crease in volatility was just 7%). But the results also support the
surprising ﬁnding from Table 8 that the volatility of staple food
prices in general either has not increased (cooking oil and sor-
ghum) or has actually decreased (beans, millet, and rice). Similarly,
in the case of conditional price volatility, rice and millet volatility
declined, while the other commodities show no statistically signif-
icant change (see Table A8).
Another attempt to reconcile the widespread view that African
food price volatility increased in the wake of the global food crisis
and the lack of empirical evidence of this is to revise the time per-
iod. Perhaps the increase in price volatility did not last four years
(2007–2010) but rather occurred just in 2008, the year that prices
peaked during the global food crisis. Table 10 shows the test results
of whether the price volatility was higher in 2008 than during the
rest of the period 2003–2010. Surprisingly, none of the prices
tested showed a statistically signiﬁcant increase in volatility, and
three of the six show a signiﬁcant decrease in volatility in 2008.
With regard to conditional volatility, none of the commodities
show a signiﬁcant change in volatility in 2008 (see Table A9).
Table 8
Change in unconditional volatility of staple food prices in Africa between 2003–2006 and 2007–2010. Source: Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period
January 2003 to December 2010.
Commodity Country Market Level N Volatility F stat p
2003–06 2007–10
Beans Kenya Nairobi Wholesale 99 0.089 0.078 1.31 0.35
Beans Mozambique Chokwe Retail 99 0.201 0.194 1.08 0.80
Beans Mozambique Gargongosa Retail 99 0.155 0.118 1.74 0.06
Beans Mozambique Manica Retail 97 0.221 0.132 2.80 0.00
Beans Mozambique Maputo Retail 99 0.084 0.089 0.89 0.67
Beans Mozambique Maxixe Retail 99 0.164 0.138 1.42 0.23
Beans Mozambique Nampula Retail 98 0.064 0.048 1.76 0.05
Beans Rwanda Kigali Retail 91 0.113 0.121 0.88 0.68
Cooking oil Mozambique Maputo Retail 97 0.065 0.064 1.05 0.86
Cooking oil Mozambique Nampula Retail 99 0.178 0.162 1.21 0.51
Maize Chad N’Djamena Retail 99 0.116 0.098 1.39 0.26
Maize Kenya Eldoret Wholesale 93 0.135 0.103 1.71 0.07
Maize Kenya Kisumu Wholesale 99 0.099 0.100 0.97 0.91
Maize Kenya Kitui Retail 98 0.109 0.251 0.19 0.00
Maize Kenya Lodwar Retail 99 0.114 0.084 1.85 0.04
Maize Kenya Mandera Retail 99 0.113 0.102 1.23 0.47
Maize Kenya Marsabit Retail 99 0.061 0.099 0.38 0.00
Maize Kenya Nairobi Wholesale 99 0.092 0.088 1.10 0.74
Maize Malawi Karonga Retail 91 0.178 0.218 0.67 0.19
Maize Mozambique Chokwe Retail 97 0.092 0.154 0.36 0.00
Maize Mozambique Gargongosa Retail 99 0.077 0.130 0.35 0.00
Maize Mozambique Manica Retail 99 0.179 0.159 1.28 0.40
Maize Mozambique Maputo Retail 99 0.127 0.079 2.61 0.00
Maize Mozambique Maxixe Retail 99 0.051 0.048 1.13 0.68
Maize Mozambique Nampula Retail 99 0.093 0.093 1.02 0.96
Maize Mozambique Tete Retail 99 0.071 0.114 0.39 0.00
Maize Niger Niamey Retail 99 0.078 0.071 1.21 0.52
Maize Tanzania Dar es Sal. Wholesale 99 0.129 0.106 1.47 0.18
Maize Tanzania Mbeya Wholesale 94 0.132 0.106 1.55 0.14
Maize Uganda Kampala Retail 97 0.121 0.094 1.65 0.09
Maize Zambia Kitwe Retail 99 0.148 0.127 1.36 0.29
Maize Zambia Lusaka Retail 99 0.119 0.102 1.35 0.30
Millet Chad Abeche Retail 99 0.110 0.105 1.11 0.73
Millet Chad Moundou Retail 99 0.155 0.098 2.49 0.00
Millet Chad Moussoro Retail 99 0.122 0.100 1.49 0.17
Millet Chad N’Djamena Retail 99 0.103 0.109 0.88 0.67
Millet Chad Sarh Retail 99 0.159 0.105 2.29 0.00
Millet Mali Gao Retail 99 0.087 0.060 2.13 0.01
Millet Mali Kayes Retail 99 0.050 0.040 1.61 0.10
Millet Mali Koulikoro Retail 99 0.114 0.048 5.55 0.00
Millet Mali Mopti Retail 99 0.081 0.047 2.89 0.00
Millet Mali Segou Retail 99 0.114 0.073 2.41 0.00
Millet Mali Sikasso Retail 99 0.083 0.057 2.10 0.01
Millet Mali Timbuktu Retail 97 0.079 0.041 3.67 0.00
Millet Niger Agadez Retail 99 0.100 0.069 2.09 0.01
Millet Niger Diffa Retail 97 0.103 0.093 1.23 0.49
Millet Niger Maradi Wholesale 99 0.113 0.111 1.03 0.92
Millet Niger Niamey Retail 99 0.085 0.082 1.07 0.83
Millet Niger Tahoua Retail 99 0.125 0.107 1.37 0.28
Millet Uganda Soroti Retail 97 0.105 0.084 1.57 0.12
Rice (local) Chad Mousoro Retail 99 0.109 0.069 2.49 0.00
Rice (local) Chad N’Djamena Retail 99 0.148 0.075 3.84 0.00
Rice (local) Niger Agadez Retail 99 0.026 0.048 0.30 0.00
Rice Mali Segou Retail 99 0.085 0.043 3.84 0.00
Rice Mozambique Manica Retail 99 0.081 0.096 0.72 0.25
Rice Mozambique Maputo Retail 99 0.056 0.053 1.15 0.63
Rice Mozambique Maxixe Retail 90 0.097 0.093 1.09 0.77
Rice Mozambique Nampula Retail 99 0.188 0.189 0.99 0.97
Rice Mozambique Tete Retail 99 0.227 0.176 1.67 0.08
Sorghum Chad Abeche Retail 97 0.078 0.114 0.46 0.01
Sorghum Chad Moundou Retail 99 0.156 0.147 1.12 0.71
Sorghum Chad N’Djamena Retail 99 0.137 0.113 1.48 0.18
Sorghum Chad Sarh Retail 99 0.174 0.208 0.70 0.22
Sorghum Mauritania Nouakchott Retail 92 0.254 0.156 2.66 0.00
Sorghum Niger Maradi Retail 94 0.112 0.080 1.97 0.02
Sorghum Niger Tahoua Retail 99 0.095 0.124 0.59 0.07
Sorghum Uganda Soroti Retail 97 0.118 0.133 0.78 0.39
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would show an increase in price volatility, thus agreeing more clo-
sely with conventional wisdom. This analysis has calculated vola-
tility as the standard deviation of monthly returns in prices, butvolatility can be calculated at other frequencies. For example, sup-
pose prices rose 10% per month for three months, then fell by the
same proportion for three months. The monthly volatility of this
series would be the same as six months alternating 10% increases
Table 9
Change in unconditional volatility in aggregated food prices in Africa between 2003–
2006 and 2007–2010. Source: Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering
the period January 2003 to December 2010.
Nbr obs Nbr prices Volatility F stat p
2003–06 2007–10
Beans 781 8 0.146 0.121 1.45 0.00
Cooking oil 196 2 0.135 0.122 1.21 0.35
Maize 2154 22 0.114 0.122 0.87 0.02
Millet 1776 18 0.107 0.082 1.68 0.00
Rice 882 9 0.127 0.106 1.46 0.00
Sorghum 776 8 0.148 0.138 1.15 0.17
Overall 6565 67 0.123 0.113 1.20 0.00
Table 10
Change in unconditional volatility in aggregated food products in Africa between
2003–2010 and 2008. Source: Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering
the period January 2003 to December 2010.
Nbr obs Nbr prices 2003–10 2008 F stat p
Beans 781 8 0.137 0.109 1.58 0.01
Cooking oil 196 2 0.127 0.138 0.84 0.53
Maize 2154 22 0.117 0.123 0.91 0.27
Millet 1776 18 0.095 0.099 0.92 0.42
Rice 882 9 0.120 0.098 1.48 0.01
Sorghum 776 8 0.146 0.118 1.51 0.01
Overall 6565 67 0.118 0.112 1.12 0.03
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Fig. 8. Distribution of unconditional volatility across African food prices. Source:
Analysis of price data from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2003 to
December 2010.
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larger, as would the volatility measured in three-month intervals.
To test this hypothesis, we run the tests in Table 9 using volatil-
ity measured at two-, four-, and six-month intervals. To save space,
we present only the volatility estimates in the two periods and the
probability of the null hypothesis of no difference (full results are
available from the author). The results are shown in Table 11.
The results indicate that the trends in volatility are not sensitive
to changes in the frequency at which it is measured. More speciﬁ-
cally, if volatility is measured at two- four-, and six-month inter-
vals, the prevailing pattern is a decline in food price volatility
between the period 2003–2006 and the period 2007–2010. The
reduction in volatility is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in
14 of the 18 product-period combinations and in all three of the
overall food-price volatility estimates. Maize prices are again the
main exception. The volatility in maize prices at two- and four-
month intervals shows no statistically signiﬁcant change between
the two periods, while the volatility of maize prices at six-month
intervals increases signiﬁcantly between the two periods.
Finally, it is possible that food price volatility has changed, but
not in a way that can be captured by the dummy variables we have
selected. Fig. 8 shows the distribution of price volatility over the 67
food prices being examined and over time. Volatility is calculated
as the standard deviation of returns in the six months leading up
to the current period. The results do not show any unusual increase
or spike in food price volatility after early 2007 when ﬁrst signs ofTable 11
Change in unconditional volatility in aggregated food products in Africa between 2003–2
from FEWS-NET (2011b) covering the period January 2003 to December 2010.
Product 2-month volatility p 4-month vol
2003–06 2007–10 2003–06
Beans 0.223 0.185 0.00 0.312
Cooking oil 0.214 0.177 0.07 0.316
Maize 0.163 0.160 0.53 0.227
Millet 0.163 0.124 0.00 0.239
Rice 0.170 0.145 0.00 0.225
Sorghum 0.203 0.176 0.00 0.276
Total 0.179 0.155 0.00 0.249the food price crisis of 2007–2007 occurred. A similar pattern can
be seen in conditional food price volatility (see Fig. A1 in the
annex).Summary and discussion
Summary
The global food crisis of 2007–2008 and the recent return of
high prices in 2010–2011 has focused attention on food price insta-
bility. This paper explores the patterns of food price volatility in
Africa and tests the idea that food price volatility has increased
in recent years.
An analysis of prices of maize, rice, and wheat on international
markets indicates that monthly unconditional price volatility was
signiﬁcantly higher during 2007–2010 compared with the previous
four-year period (2003–2006) and compared with the long-term
volatility during 1980–2006. Although these results conﬁrm the
conventional wisdom regarding international prices, they contrast
with a few recent studies that ﬁnd only limited evidence of in-
creased volatility of international food prices (Gilbert and Morgan,
2010; OECD and FAO, 2011).
The volatility of wholesale and retail food prices in the eleven
African countries examined is quite high. The average uncondi-
tional volatility of the 167 prices examined, measured by the stan-
dard deviation of the monthly proportional change in price, is
0.116, but the volatility is more than 0.141 in a full one-quarter
of the prices. In contrast, the unconditional volatility of interna-
tional grain prices is in the range of 0.06–0.08.
Among the price series examined, the commodities with the
lowest volatility are processed goods (cooking oil and bread) and
tradable commodities (wheat and rice). Millet and teff also have
relatively low price volatility, perhaps because of their drought006 and 2007–2010 measured at different frequencies. Source: Analysis of price data
atility p 6-month volatility p
2007–10 2003–06 2007–10
0.251 0.00 0.357 0.288 0.00
0.239 0.01 0.377 0.287 0.01
0.225 0.75 0.249 0.273 0.00
0.169 0.00 0.290 0.190 0.00
0.175 0.00 0.241 0.195 0.00
0.228 0.00 0.330 0.259 0.00
0.208 0.00 0.288 0.243 0.00
54 N. Minot / Food Policy 45 (2014) 45–56resistance. Cowpeas, maize, and beans have the highest levels of
price volatility among those studies.
Within our data set, the price volatility of tradable products
(wheat, rice, and cooking oil) is signiﬁcantly lower than that of
nontradable commodities. This is not too surprising in light of
the relatively low volatility of international commodity prices.
However, this ﬁnding raises questions about whether staple food
self-sufﬁciency would be an effective strategy to reduce price
volatility.
Food price volatility is lower in the largest cities in each country
than in the secondary cities, at least within the African countries
examined in this analysis. This is presumably due to the fact that
these large cities beneﬁt from inﬂows from various regions with
different seasonal supply patterns.
Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have large state-owned
trading enterprises that buy and sell maize and other staples in an
attempt to stabilize prices. Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that
maize price volatility is signiﬁcantly higher in these four countries,
which intervene most actively in their maize markets, compared
with other countries with little or no efforts to manage prices.
Although we ﬁnd strong evidence that price volatility in inter-
national grain markets has increased since 2007, there is little or
no evidence of increased price volatility in African staple food mar-
kets in the eleven countries examined. Of 67 prices tested, only 7
show statistically signiﬁcant increases in unconditional volatility
in 2007–2010, but 17 show signiﬁcant decreases in volatility.
Two-thirds of the prices examined (43 of 67) do not have any sta-
tistically signiﬁcant change in volatility.
Of the six products tested, only maize shows a statistically sig-
niﬁcant increase in price volatility since 2007. Three commodities
(beans, millet, and rice) show lower price volatility since 2007.
Similar results were obtained when we examined the price volatil-
ity in 2008 compared with the rest of the period 2003–2010 and
when measuring conditional volatility rather than unconditional
volatility. In addition, calculating volatility at two-, four-, and
six-month intervals rather than at monthly intervals does not af-
fect the results. Nor is any apparent increase in volatility in graphs
of the distribution of unconditional and conditional food price vol-
atility over time.Discussion
The most surprising result is that little or no evidence exists to
show a statistically signiﬁcant increase in food price volatility in
Africa. Some prices have become more volatile during 2007–
2010, but a larger number have become more stable.
One reason that this ﬁnding is unexpected is that international
food markets have become more volatile in recent years. Given
than most African countries are net food importers, it is natural
to assume that the volatility in international food markets would
be transmitted to domestic African markets. However, several
studies have highlighted the low level of price transmission from
international markets to African food markets (Quiroz and Soto,
1995; Conforti, 2004; Minot, 2011). For example, Minot (2011)
found that only 13 of 62 African food prices showed a statistically
signiﬁcant long-term relationship with international prices. In
light of this ﬁnding, it is quite plausible that African food prices
have not become more volatile in spite of the increased price vol-
atility in international food markets.
However, it is more difﬁcult to reconcile the widespread view
that food price volatility has increased in African markets with
the lack of empirical support for this trend. We show that volatility
measured at lower frequencies yields the same general trend.
However, it is possible that price volatility has increased at a high-
er frequency (for example, weekly) that is not captured by ouranalysis. An analysis of weekly food price data from Africa would
test this hypothesis.
Another possibility is that the conventional measure of volatil-
ity, the standard deviation of returns, does not match our intuitive
understanding of what volatility is. For example, consumers may
perceive a price increase from 200 to 220 to be a larger ﬂuctuation
than an increase from 80 to 88, even though they are equivalent in
terms of the proportional return and in terms of the standard mea-
sure of volatility. In other words, our intuitive understanding of
volatility may not be based on proportional changes but some
combination of proportional and absolute changes.
A third possibility is that the apparent increase in volatility is a
misconception. Volatility is not an easy concept to observe directly.
Comparing the level of prices at two points in time requires just
two data points, but comparing the degree of volatility requires a
comparison of two sets of data points. In other words, it may be
that the widespread view that African food prices have become
more volatile is just a misconception that has become reinforced
by repetition in the media. Although further research is warranted,
this seems the most likely explanation.
What are the implications of these ﬁndings for food policy and
price stabilization programs? First, at the international level, they
suggest that greater attention should be paid to the degree to
which price volatility in international markets is transmitted to
markets in developing countries. To the extent that our ﬁndings
for eleven countries in Africa are replicated for other countries
and regions, there may be less reason for concern about price vol-
atility in international food markets.
At the regional and national levels, the results imply that great-
er attention should be given to the level of food prices (particularly
high food prices) in Africa rather than price volatility per se, since
any adverse effects of the crisis must have been driven by the level
of food prices rather than volatility. Food price volatility remains
an issue, but it is arguably no more of an issue now than it was be-
fore the global food crisis of 2007–2008.
Of course, these ﬁndings do not necessarily undermine the
rationale for efforts to reduce food price volatility. Food price vol-
atility is higher in African than in other regions of the world and
much higher than in international food markets. Many of the pro-
posals in the G20 Action Plan, such as the strengthening of safety
net programs and better information about prices and stock levels,
would be advisable regardless of the trend in food price volatility.
However, the results suggest that food self-sufﬁciency is not a
promising strategy for reducing food price volatility. Within the
prices and countries covered by this study, international food
prices are more stable than African food prices, and within Africa,
the prices of tradable foods (such as rice, wheat, and cooking oil)
are less volatile than the prices of commodities for which countries
are self-sufﬁcient (beans, cowpeas, sorghum, and millet). Thus, the
results support the argument that international trade can play a
useful role in stabilizing food prices.
Regional trade can also contribute to reducing food price vola-
tility. The ﬁnding that food prices are more stable in large cities
than in small cities is probably due to the better transport infra-
structure and the greater level of integration with different nearby
markets. Reducing barriers to cross-border trade would increase
the level of integration of smaller cities with nearby cities in other
countries, facilitating food inﬂows in times of shortage and out-
ﬂows in times of surplus.
Finally, the results raise questions about the effectiveness of
traditional food price stabilization programs. Four countries in
our sample have large state-owned enterprises that attempt to sta-
bilize prices, particularly maize prices, by buying when the price is
low and selling when the price is high. Yet maize price volatility is
signiﬁcantly higher in these countries than in African countries
with little or no maize price stabilization efforts. It is possible that
Table A3
Conditional price volatility of tradable and nontradable products. Source: Analysis
based on data from FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat P
Non-tradables 6225 83 0.114 0.000 0.00
Tradable products 2250 30 0.094 1.479 0.00
Total 8475 113 0.109 0.000 0.00
Table A4
Conditional price volatility of maize by country. Source: Analysis based on data from
FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Chad 150 2 0.120 0.92 0.48
Ethiopia 225 3 0.091 1.71 0.00
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prompting the stabilization efforts. Alternatively, the results may
indicate that these stabilizations efforts have been counter-pro-
ductive. A number of studies that suggest that unpredictable gov-
ernment intervention in maize markets and trade restrictions that
often accompany these policies can inhibit private traders from
participating in trade and storage activities, which increases sea-
sonal volatility and exacerbates price spikes associated with supply
shortfalls.
Naturally, our ability to generalize the results and policy in-
sights from this analysis to the whole continent is constrained by
the possibility that the study’s sample of countries and markets
may not be fully representative and that the time periods covered
in the study may be too short. Extending the analysis to a larger set
of markets and longer periods would provide more robust
conclusions.Kenya 375 5 0.092 1.74 0.00
Malawi 300 4 0.188 0.31 0.00
Mozambique 525 7 0.107 1.25 0.00
Niger 225 3 0.091 1.70 0.00
Nigeria 75 1 0.101 1.34 0.10
Uganda 75 1 0.090 1.67 0.01
Zambia 225 3 0.143 0.62 0.00
Total 2175 29 0.116 0.00 0.00
Table A5
Conditional maize price volatility by level of intervention. Source: Analysis based onAcknowledgments
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Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Low 1275 17 0.101 0.00 0.00
High 900 12 0.137 0.00 0.00
Total 2175 29 0.116 0.55 0.00Appendix: Tests of conditional price volatility
Tests of differences in conditional price volatility were imple-
mented with Stata software. The GARCH(1,1) estimation of the re-
turns, r, was carried out for each price series with the command
arch r, arch(1) garch(1). Then, the predicted conditionalTable A1
Conditional price volatility in international grain prices. Source: Analysis based on
data from FEWS-NET (2011b).
N 1980–2006 2007–2010 F stat p
Maize 372 0.057 0.061 0.88 0.51
Rice 372 0.054 0.079 0.48 0.00
Wheat 372 0.051 0.078 0.43 0.00
IMF food index 372 0.027 0.036 0.58 0.01
N 2003–2006 2007–2010 F stat p
Maize 96 0.057 0.061 0.87 0.64
Rice 96 0.041 0.079 0.27 0.00
Wheat 96 0.052 0.078 0.45 0.01
IMF food index 96 0.027 0.036 0.56 0.05
Table A2
Conditional price volatility across products. Source: Analysis based on data from
FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr of obs Nbr of prices Volatility F stat p
Beans 600 8 0.128 0.713 0.00
Bread 75 1 0.030 13.231 0.00
Cooking oil 300 4 0.094 1.352 0.00
Cowpeas 225 3 0.228 0.215 0.00
Maize 2175 29 0.116 0.845 0.00
Millet 1800 24 0.098 1.320 0.00
Rice 1725 23 0.095 1.406 0.00
Sorghum 1125 15 0.121 0.788 0.00
Teff 225 3 0.080 1.898 0.00
Wheat 225 3 0.087 1.575 0.00
Total 8475 113 0.126 0.000 0.00
Table A6
Conditional price volatility in coastal and landlocked countries by product. Source:
Analysis based on data from FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr obs Nbr prices Coastal Landlocked F stat p
Beans 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Bread 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Cooking oil 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Cowpea 225 3 0.214 0.256 0.70 0.07
Maize 2175 29 0.100 0.129 0.61 0.00
Millet 1800 24 0.116 0.095 1.48 0.00
Rice 1725 23 0.125 0.075 2.78 0.00
Sorghum 1125 15 0.138 0.115 1.44 0.00
Teff 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Wheat 225 3 0.117 0.073 2.59 0.00
Table A7
Conditional price volatility in the largest city and other cities by product. Source:
Analysis based on data from FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr obs Nbr prices Largest city Other cities F stat p
Beans 600 8 0.088 0.133 0.44 0.00
Cooking oil 300 4 0.084 0.098 0.74 0.13
Maize 2175 29 0.094 0.121 0.61 0.00
Millet 1800 24 0.102 0.097 1.10 0.40
Sorghum 1125 15 0.174 0.117 2.21 0.00
Wheat 225 3 0.117 0.073 2.59 0.00
Total 8434 0 0.097 0.110 0.77 0.00
Table A8
Changes in conditional price volatility between 2003–2006 and 2007–2010 by
product. Source: Analysis based on data from FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr obs Nbr prices 2003–2006 2007–2010 F stat p
Beans 480 5 0.118 0.108 1.19 0.17
Maize 1536 16 0.102 0.101 1.02 0.74
Millet 1248 13 0.097 0.087 1.26 0.00
Rice 768 8 0.102 0.090 1.29 0.01
Sorghum 576 6 0.139 0.129 1.16 0.21
Overall 4608 48 0.107 0.100 1.16 0.00
Table A9
Changes in conditional price volatility between 2003–2010 and 2008 by product.
Source: Analysis based on data from FEWS-NET (2011b).
Nbr obs Nbr prices 2003–2010 2008 F stat p
Beans 495 5 0.113 0.112 1.01 1.00
Maize 1584 16 0.101 0.105 0.92 0.40
Millet 1287 13 0.092 0.092 1.00 0.97
Rice 792 8 0.096 0.099 0.94 0.65
Sorghum 594 6 0.134 0.133 1.03 0.92
Overall 4752 48 0.103 0.105 0.97 0.58
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Fig. A1. Distribution of conditional volatility across African food prices. Source:
Analysis based on GARCH(1,1) analysis of 50 food prices from FEWS-NET (2011b).
56 N. Minot / Food Policy 45 (2014) 45–56variance for each observation was stored in the variable h with the
command predict h, variance. Finally, an F-test of differences in
the conditional variance across groups of price series was per-
formed using the command vartest h, by(group). Additional
information is available from the author upon request. See Tables
A1–A9 and Fig. A1.References
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